ABSTRACT The high penetration of third-party intellectual property is accompanied with severe security issues, and thus, security constraints during task scheduling have recently been proposed for protecting multiprocessor system-on-chip systems. However, these security constraints incur significant overheads in terms of the schedule length and design cost. In this paper, the multi-dimensional design optimization space (schedule length, design cost, area, and security) is explored, and two task scheduling approaches in the context of security constraints are proposed. In resource-constrained task scheduling approach, the maximum clique of a vendor violation graph is accurately calculated, enabling a minimized number of security constraint violations under the vendor constraint. In addition, task scheduling is conducted alongside vendor assignment to optimize the schedule length. In performance-constrained task scheduling approach, a max-flow min-cut-based task clustering method is first proposed to iteratively reduce the schedule length of the graph containing all critical paths. Then, vendor assignment is performed by solving a graph coloring problem, and all tasks are finally scheduled with an optimization of hardware resources. The experimental results demonstrate that our resource-constrained task scheduling approach reduces the schedule length by 28.2% with all security constraints satisfied; besides, 18.0% cores are saved by our performance-constrained task scheduling approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Market scaling has increased the design productivity requirements for heterogeneous Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC). Thus, MPSoC designers have started to utilize third-party intellectual property (3PIP) cores to meet the soaring demand of the global market. However, the high penetration of 3PIPs has brought new challenges for MPSoC hardware design, and security is one of the most important issues.
Indeed, the growing number of mission-critical applications (e.g., finance, military, and transportation) that use MPSoCs means that security is the highest priority issue. In these systems, MPSoCs are expected to be 100% trustworthy and their security-aware design is of great importance. In addition, the increasing integration of 3PIPs and the outsourcing of fabrication lead to the fact that heterogeneous MPSoCs have a high risk of malicious modification because the 3PIPs are not 100% trustworthy. Foundries may make subtle mask changes or insert disguised malicious modifications during fabrication, and this situation becomes more complicated when 3PIPs from the same vendor collude with each other. Thus, vendors may distribute Trojans on different 3PIP cores and activate them via secret communication paths only when these cores work together.
These emerging problems require that designers develop techniques for detecting possible hardware Trojan attacks or for muting their effects, and several areas of study inform the field of hardware trust [1] : 1) Trojan detection approaches, 2) design for trust approaches, and 3) runtime monitoring approaches. Trojans detection approaches typically attempt to detect the existence of Trojans at an IP level, and they can be further classified into follows: physical inspection [2] where an engineer must repeatedly scan the surface while grinding the layers of the chip after the molding coat is cut; functional testing [3] by stimulating the input ports of a chip and monitoring the output to detect manufacturing faults; built-in tests [4] - [6] by adding circuitry to the chip to help verify that the as-built chip implements its functional specification; and side-channel analyses [7] - [13] of the signals generated by electric activity to obtain the information about the state of the device and the data it processes, thereby detecting tightly coupled Trojans based on these signals.
The high penetration of 3PIPs is accompanied with severe security issues because it is impossible to detect all of the hardware Trojans in 3PIPs, and thus, several design for trust approaches have been proposed in higher design abstraction levels. Beaumont et al. [14] developed an online Trojan detection architecture that implements fragmentation, replication, and voting. Rajendran et al. [15] focused on the Electronic System Level (ESL) design tools and added protection against attacks at the ESL to make it more robust. Jiang et al. [16] proposed a novel secure embedded systems design framework for efficiently optimizing the runtime quality with security constraints. Cui et al. [17] implemented both Trojan detection and recovery at run-time, which are essential for mission-critical applications.
Recent works have also proposed using multiple copies of the same IP from different vendors to compare using unrolling [18] and validation [19] techniques, and they incorporate security constraints in high level synthesis to identify malicious inclusions. Building on the preliminary version of security constraints, a set of researchers have proposed the design-for-trust techniques for MPSoCs [20] , [21] , and another set of researchers reduce the power/area/delay overhead of the technique [22] .
However, fulfilling the security constraints always incurs a significant overheads in terms of design cost, area and performance delay, and we focus on how to balance these practical factors with security-aware design in this study. Security constraints are integrated into the task scheduling process in a more practical manner by considering design cost (modeled as the numbers of IP vendors required), area constraints (modeled as the number of cores available, which is also named as resource constraints) and performance constraints (modeled as schedule length). The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows.
• In contrast to a previously proposed method [21] which conducts task scheduling and vendor assignment in different steps, we integrate task scheduling alongside vendor assignment. This reduces the schedule length by 28 .2% with all security constraints satisfied.
• The maximum clique of a vendor violation graph, which equals the number of IP vendors required, is accurately calculated with a small computational cost.
• This proposed MPSoC scheduler explores multi-dimensional design optimization space (performance, design cost, area and security), and the number of security constraint violations is minimized. Thus, the proposed algorithms could be widely used.
• A max-flow min-cut-based algorithm is proposed for a performance-security trade-off by assigning adjacent timing-critical tasks to the same core, with a minimum number of security constraint violations. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the threat model and presents the security architecture. Section 3 introduces the motivation and describes the problem optimization targets. Sections 4 and 5 describe two task scheduling approaches with resource constraints and performance constraints, respectively. Section 6 gives the experimental results and we conclude this paper in Section 7.
II. THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
At present, the industry needs to procure and use the latest Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 3PIPs in order to track the most cutting edge technology while reducing the design and manufacturing costs. However, the hardware Trojans in 3PIPs components present high risks of malicious inclusions and data leakage in products [23] .
A. TROJAN ATTACKS THROUGH HARDWARE IPs
In General, the Register Transfer-Level (RTL) files of IPs might have been imported from third party vendors, and 3PIPs procured from IP vendors are usually not 100% trustworthy. There may be a rogue insider in a 3PIP house who may insert Trojan logic in 3PIPs coming out of the IP house, and the Trojans may modify function, deny service, or create a backdoor to leak confidential information. The possibility of Trojan attacks in 3PIP poses a major integrity concern to SoC designers.
Verification of trust of an IP acquired from untrusted thirdparty sources can be extremely challenging due to lack of golden models. Conventional verification approaches, which rely on the presence of a golden or reference design, do not work in case of 3PIPs. Functional simulation or emulation does not provide adequate coverage due to often incomplete functional specifications, and it cannot provide assurance against additional functionality due to a Trojan. For example, if a processor IP core triggers a malicious memory write for an ''add'' instruction with a specific rare combination of operands, both simulation and emulation are very likely to fail because they may not excite all rare conditions [24] . An example of Trojan attack in a wireless video capture System-on-Chip is shown in Fig. 1 [20] . The timer and bus controller (BC) are obtained from a 3PIP vendor and maybe infected with Trojans. During the normal operation, the BC controls the system bus when the timer expires, and the timer sends a packet to the BC through the system bus to inform the expiration of time. During the malicious operation, the timer embeds a trigger in its packet, and this trigger activates the Trojan in the BC and puts the system bus in a tristate. All IPs connected in the system bus cannot communicated with each other, resulting in a denial-of-service attack.
B. TROJAN DETECTION IN HARDWARE IPs
Today's SoC designs use a large number of IP cores from different IP vendors, with varying degree of reliability associated with each vendor. Trojans may be inserted into IPs of different forms by a rogue designer or an untrusted CAD tool in an IP design house. Most of the existing solutions for trusted IP acquisition fall into the following classes.
1) CODE ANALYSIS
Detection all of the hardware Trojans in 3PIPs is extremely difficult since there is no known golden model for 3PIPs as IP vendors usually provide specification and source code, both of which may contain Trojans, and when a Trojan exists in an IP core, all fabricated ICs including these IPs will contain Trojans. A Trojan can be very well hidden during the normal functional operation of the 3PIP supplied as RTL code. An attacker may distribute few RTL codes so as to reduce Trojan footprint, and a large industrial-strength IP core can include thousands of lines of code, resulting in identifying the few lines of RTL code in an IP core that represent a Trojan to be an extremely challenging task.
The code coverage analysis on RTL codes may identify suspicious signals that may be a part of a Trojan [25] , [26] . However, even 100% coverage of the RTL code does not guarantee that it is fault free [27] . Hence, the code coverage analysis does not guarantee its trustworthiness [20] .
2) FORMAL VERIFICATION
An SoC integrator and a 3PIP vendor can agree upon predefined security properties that the IP should satisfy [28] , and the SoC integrator can check the 3PIP for the properties. To check if a 3PIP honors these properties, the target 3PIP is converted into a proof checking format (e.g., Coq). This has been demonstrated to detect data leakage [5] and malicious modifications to registers [29] . In addition, conventional verification techniques are also used to detect data leakage [30] and modifications to registers [6] .
However, formal verification also has several limitations, which are: 1) one cannot check if the 3PIP has vulnerabilities while satisfying the agreed-upon properties [5] ; 2) the absence of automation tools that convert VHDL/Verilog into Coq format; 3) a Coq representation is considered trustworthy does not necessarily mean that the corresponding VHDL/Verilog representation is trustworthy [20] .
3) DESIGN-FOR-TRUST TECHNIQUES
The SoC integrator modifies the target design to mute the effects of Trojans or detect them, and this proposed work falls under this category. Recently, researchers begin to use an integer linear programming formulation to model the constraints to detect run-time errors and recover from infected 3PIPs [17] . Building on the preliminary version of security constraints in [19] , a set of researchers have proposed the design-for-trust techniques for MPSoCs [20] , [21] , and reduce the power/area/delay overhead of the technique [22] .
C. SECURITY-DRIVEN CONSTRAINTS
An application is always decomposed into a set of computational entities, called tasks, and these tasks are linked by precedence constraints. Task scheduling schedules tasks to cores and coordinates data accesses, communication, and synchronization among tasks [21] . The number of cores required in the MPSoC as well as the schedule length is determined in this step.
The task graph is denoted by TG, where TG = {V , E}; V = {v 1 , v 2 , ...} represents the set of tasks, and E is the set of edges representing the data dependencies between every pair of tasks. An example of TG is shown in Fig. 3(a) .
One of the most common task scheduling methods to guard the MPSoC system has been recently proposed in [21] , in which IPs are purchased from different vendors without worrying about their individual security problems. All tasks are then scheduled and bound to the cores under the following two kinds of security constraints: task duplication and vendor diversity, and these security constraints handle two major types of Trojans: those tampering program outputs and those leaking information through undesired communication paths [21] .
1) TASK DUPLICATION
Trojaned hardware may produce incorrect outputs, which might cause the underlying systems to fail. To mute the attack footprint, the attacker only needs to tamper with the outputs of several tasks in complex systems that always comprise hundreds of tasks in practice. Thus, although a core can execute multiple tasks, its hibernating Trojan is triggered by a specific input. Diversifying the sources of a 3PIP will help detect the wrong outputs caused by Trojans, because 3PIPs from different vendors will have different implementations even for identical functionality [20] .
Task duplication constraint duplicately executes each task on the cores from different vendors, and the outputs of these cores may vary and they will be compared by a trusted component (not designed by the third party) to ensure the trustworthiness of the comparison step. The methods to compare results from different cores have been demonstrated by Gizopoulos [31] , which are applicable to our work. This security architecture compares the final task outcome instead of performing cycle-by-cycle comparison of signals and instruction results. If the comparison fails, all dependent tasks are terminated and a security flag is raised. In the following discussion, the duplicate task of v i is denoted as v i , and the duplicated task graph is denoted as TG . VOLUME 6, 2018 2) VENDOR DIVERSITY To mute the Trojan footprint, the attacker always distributes Trojans in multiple IP cores and constructs secret communications between IP cores to leak information, or to trigger the hibernating Trojans [21] . In this study, we assume that the secret communication between IP cores from the same vendor cannot be acquired by other vendors and that the attackers of different vendors plant different hardware Trojans. An example of triggering Trojans between cores is illustrated in Fig. 2 , where Task1 is the parent of Task2 and Task3, Core1 and Core2 are from the same vendor, and they share the same triggering value. If Core1 reaches the triggering condition, it writes the triggering value to a secret memory location that is accessed by Core2, and thus, the Trojans implanted in Core2 will be activated. However, Core3 is unable to fetch the triggering value, and its triggering condition is also different because it is produced by a different vendor. This example demonstrates that executing adjacent tasks by the cores from different IP vendors cuts the secret communications between cores and isolates the Trojan from the rest of the system.
The redundant execution approaches, including voting architecture [14] , dual modular redundancy (DMR) [31] , [32] , and task duplication constraint, detect the hardware Trojans by comparing the outputs of cores from different IP vendors with the same input; however, they cannot cut off these secret communications. Therefore, the vendor diversity constraint, which forces the adjacent tasks to be executed by the cores from different IP vendors, is also introduced to isolate the triggered hardware Trojans from the rest of the system.
III. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION A. MOTIVATION 1) MOTIVATION1: SCHEDULE LENGTH OPTIMIZATION
With all security constraints satisfied, Liu et al. [21] perform task scheduling and vendor assignment in different stages. However, the number of cores available from each vendor is ignored during scheduling, and this might cause additional delay to the schedule length because several datadependency-free tasks can no longer be executed parallel due to the limited number of cores. Example of task scheduling results generated by Liu et al. [21] is presented in Fig. 3 (b), with the input task graph given in Fig. 3(a) . The solid lines and dashed lines represent inter-core and intra-core communications, respectively, and the communication delay is marked next to the edge. Each node has four values: V i is the i−th task and its duplicated task is V i ; C j denotes the assigned core j; p − q are the start and finish times. The computational cost of each task is the same.
In Fig. 3 (b), tasks V 3 and V 4 are assigned to vendor3, and only one core C5 is available to compute these two tasks. Thus, V 3 and V 4 cannot be computed parallel, making the schedule length to be 100 u.t.. However, Fig. 3 (c) show a task scheduling result with proper vendor assignment, and its schedule length is only 90 u.t.. To assign each task with a proper vendor so as to optimize the schedule length, we will conduct task scheduling alongside vendor assignment. This is because we decide the vendor assignment of a task only when we start to schedule this task, and the core assignments together with the scheduling results of its ancestors can be counted on, which helps to improve the final scheduling result.
2) MOTIVATION2: SECURITY CONSTRAINT VIOLATION MINIMIZATION
Fulfills the security constraints at the finest granularity, but this incurs significant overheads in terms of design cost, area and system performance. Therefore, researchers also explore the possibility of grouping dependent tasks into a cluster and scheduling the entire cluster to a single core [21] to hide the inter-core communication latency. This reduces schedule length and area of the MPSoC system, but violates the security constraints. In this study, the edge that connects two clustered tasks is called contracted edge.
Suppose a task graph contains n nodes and m edges, and the number of all security constraints (denoted as scy) is n + 2m: The number of task duplication constraints is n, and the numbers of vendor diversity constraints in TG and its duplicated TG are both m. However, several security constraints may be violated when optimizing the schedule length and the number of IP vendors required, and the two types of security constraint violations are: 1) task duplication violation, where a task and its duplicated task are conducted by the cores from the same vendor; 2) vendor diversity violation, where a task and its adjacent tasks are assigned to the cores from the same vendor. The number of security constraint violations is denoted as scy v , and a large number of security constraint violations always lead a high hardware Trojan trigging risk.
Liu et al. [21] maximally explore the scheduler's ability in clustering timing-critical tasks on a single core to minimize the schedule length, however, they ignore the number of security constraint violations during task clustering. Suppose the task graph is given in Fig. 3(d) , and the target is to optimize the schedule length to 60 u.t.. The cluster-based scheduling result of Liu et al. [21] is presented in Fig. 3 (e), whose scy v is 6. However, the best task clustering and scheduling results are presented in Fig. 3(f) , and the resulting scy v is only 4, meaning a smaller Trojan triggering risk. To sum up, the following three aspects are ignored by most of the existed works.
1) The number of security constraint violations must be minimized when optimizing the schedule length and the number of IP vendors. 2) Rather than maximally minimizing the schedule length with a large number of security constraint violations, designers may prefer to make trade-off between security and performance.
3) The number of cores also needs to be optimized, because it is closely related to the circuit area and the power consumption.
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this study, two security-aware task scheduling problems are studied, with design cost, area and system performance constrained. The design cost is modeled as the number of IP vendors, the area constraint (also named as resource constraint) is modeled as the number of cores, and the performance constraint is modeled as the maximum delay that the schedule length must not exceed. The first optimization problem in this study is named as the security-aware resource-constrained task scheduling problem, which is described as follows.
Problem 1: Inputs: task graph TG, vendor constraints, and resource constraints. The target is to find a schedule that would minimize the number of security constraint violations; in addition, schedule length is minimized.
The objective function of Problem 1 is formulated as follows.
where scy v is the number of security constraint violations, and SL is the schedule length. α 1 is a constant large enough to keep the minimization of scy v as the first priority. Tasks are clustered to satisfy the vendor constraints, and if the vendor constraint is not given in Problem 1, this problem becomes a schedule length optimization problem with all security constraints satisfied.
The second optimization problem concerned in this study is the security-aware performance-constrained task scheduling problem, which is described as follows.
Problem 2: Inputs: task graph TG, vendor constraints, and performance constraints. The target is to find a schedule that would minimize the number of security constraint violations; in addition, the number of resources is minimized.
The objective function of Problem 2 is given as follows.
min : α 2 * scy v + core req (2) where core req is the number of cores required by the scheduling result to execute both TG and its duplicate TG , and α 2 is a constant large enough to ensure that the minimization of scy v is the first priority.
IV. SECURITY-AWARE RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
The security constraints [20] , [21] protect systems from potential attacks in the 3PIP cores, but they also incur overheads in terms of design cost, area and schedule length. Therefore, a resource-constrained task scheduling approach is proposed in this section, to solve the problem described in Problem 1. Fig. 4 gives the flow of this approach, which consists of the following three steps. • Vendor-constrained task clustering enforces the vendor constraints, with a minimum number of security constraint violations.
• Candidate vendors determination figures out a set of vendors that can be assigned to each task during scheduling, and the vendor constraints are strictly satisfied. This process consists of candidate color set determination and clique size updating.
• Task coloring and scheduling determines the vendor and core assignments of a task, and simultaneously schedules this task to its best period.
A. VENDOR-CONSTRAINED TASK CLUSTERING
Definition 1 (Clique Size): ω(G) is the number of nodes in a maximum clique of G, and it is called the clique size of G.
The vendor violation graph (VVG) is constructed from TG: VVG = (V V , E V ), where V V = {c 1 , c 2 , ...} is the set of clusters. An edge in E V means that the two connected clusters must be assigned to different vendors.
The index of a cluster is decided by the minimum index of the tasks in this cluster; e.g., if a cluster contains {v 3 , v 5 , v 9 }, this cluster is then denoted as c 3 . At the very beginning of executing task clustering, each cluster in V V contains one task, and each edge in VVG represents a security constraint. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the VVG derived from Fig. 5(a) . The problem of finding the minimum number of vendors required becomes the calculation of ω(VVG). However, the maximum clique problem is NP-hard in traditional graphs.
Definition 2 (Induced Subgraph):
Let V V (c i ) be the set of all adjacent nodes of c i in VVG and
is an induced subgraph of VVG, and its node set is V V (c i ). An example of VVG I (c 3 ) is shown in Fig. 5(c) .
The number of nodes in V V (c i ) is very limited because each task only have several adjacent tasks in task graph. This makes the time of calculating ω(VVG I (c i )) to be constant in practice. ω(VVG) can be calculated as follows. After calculating the clique sizes of all clusters, a vendor clique graph (VCG) is then constructed. VCG is an induced subgraph of VVG:
An edge (c i , c j ) in VCG is a clique edge when c i and c j are in the same maximum clique set. Contracting the non-clique edge will not reduce the clique size of VVG, and thus these edges will be removed from VCG first.
Lemma 1: An edge (c i , c j ) in VCG is a clique edge when at least ω(VVG) − 2 nodes in VCG connect both c i and c j . Fig. 5 (e) illustrates the VCG derived from the VVG in Fig. 5(b) . There are four different maximum clique sets, i.e., {c 2 , c 3 , c 5 }, {c 2 , c 3 , c 6 }, {c 2 , c 3 , c 5 }, {c 2 , c 3 , c 6 }. If we contract the edge (c 2 , c 3 ), the clique sizes of {c 2 , c 3 , c 5 } and {c 2 , c 3 , c 6 } will reduce to 2; otherwise, two edges need to be contracted to reduce the clique sizes of these two cliques. To reduce the clique size of VVG by contracting the least edges, we first need to determine the edges that are the most appropriate ones for contraction.
Let deg(c i ) be the number of clique edges connected to c i and there are deg(c i ) − ω(VVG) + 2 different maximum clique sets containing c i . The number of maximum clique sets eliminated after contracting e ij is denoted by num(e ij ), and the priority of a clique edge e ij is denoted by pri(e ij ), which can be calculated as follows.
where θ ij be the number of security constraint violations if we contract e ij in VVG. In practice, not all of the adjacent tasks can be clustered because some tasks must be executed on particular IP cores, and thus, the priorities of corresponding edges are set as 0.
Our aim is to eliminate all of the maximum cliques by contracting the least edges, and thus, the clique edge with the highest priority should be contracted first. The steps involved in clustering tasks to satisfy the vendor constraint are summarized in Algorithm 1. This task clustering method 15668 VOLUME 6, 2018 Construct VCG from VVG;
for each e ∈ VCG do 6: if e is not a clique edge then 7: VCG.del_edge(e); 8: end if 9: end for 10: while VCG.empty()! = true do 11: Calculate pri(e), ∀e ∈ VCG;
12:
Find the edge e ij ∈ VCG, with the highest priority;
13:
Cluster(c i , c j ); 14: Update VCG; 15: end while 16: Update VVG, and recalculate ω(VVG); 17: end while is also applicable for the situation that there are not enough vendors for a particular IP. Suppose the vendor constraint for this particular IP is λ and let VVG p be an induced subgraph of VVG with the node set consisting of all tasks that can only be executed by this IP. The vendor-constrained task clustering is then executed on VVG p with the vendor constraint λ to generate the task clustering solution.
B. CANDIDATE COLOR SET DETERMINATION
After vendor-constrained task clustering, we will first decide the set of vendors that can be assign to each task, and this process is regarded as an graph coloring problem. Each color represents a IP vendor in VVG, and the candidate color set of c i comprises all of the colors that can be assigned to cluster c i , which is denoted as clr(c i ). The candidate color set of each cluster contains all colors at the very beginning. Each time after assigning a cluster with a specific color, we need to update the candidate color sets of certain clusters. The vendor constraint will be violated after assigning c i with color k if VVG s (c i ) contains a λ−clique (λ is the vendor constraint). The steps of determining the candidate color set are given in Algorithm 2, and an example showing the calculation of clr(c 6 ) is illustrated in Fig. 6 , where the vendor constraint is λ = 3. Fig. 6(a) shows the VVG where c 5 and c 8 have already been assigned with colors, and we need to decide whether c 6 can be assigned with color 1 . The VVG s (c 6 ) derived from VVG is shown in Fig. 6(b) , where the clique Determine all sensitive nodes and construct VVG s (c i ); 6: for each node v ∈ VVG s (c i ) do 7: if ω(v) < λ then 8: VVG s (c i ).del_node(v); 9: end if 10: end for 11: counter:=0; 12: for each node v ∈ VVG s (c i ) do 13: if VVG s (c i ).degree(v) ≥ λ − 1 then 14: counter++; 15: end if 16: end for 17: if counter ≥ λ then 18: Remove color k from clr(c i ); 19: end if 20: end for size of each node is indicated next to the node. The sensitive nodes are c 2 , c 3 , c 5 , and c 8 . Then, VVG s (c 6 ) comprising all sensitive nodes are constructed, as shown in Fig. 6(c) . In this example, there exists three nodes whose degrees are no smaller than 2 after removing c 12 from VVG s (c 6 ), and this means that VVG s (c 6 ) contains a 3-clique, and color 1 / ∈ clr(c 6 ).
C. CLIQUE SIZE UPDATING
After assigning a specific color color k to a cluster c i , the clique sizes of all sensitive nodes must be updated.
Let c j be a sensitive node in VVG s (c i ) and φ be the clique size of c j before clique size updating. The calculation of ω(c j ) after clique size updating is expressed as follows.
Each time after updating the clique size of a sensitive node c j , we must check if the clique size of c i need to be updated. Let ϕ be the clique size of c i before clique size updating, and the clique size of c i (ω(c i )) is updated as follows.
The clique size increment of c j is caused by connecting c i and c j with a sensitive edge, and thus, the clique size of c i must be no smaller than the clique size of c j if the clique size of c j is increased; otherwise, the clique size of c i remains the same. The brief steps of updating the clique sizes of nodes in VVG after assigning a specific color color k to c i are described in Algorithm 3. φ: the clique size of c j in G; 7: if a φ−clique containing c j exists in VVG s (c i ) then 8: ω(c j ) := φ + 1;
Algorithm 3 Clique Size Updating After Assigning

9:
if ω(c i ) < ω(c j ) then 10: ω(c i ) := ω(c j ); 11: end if 12: else 13: ω(c j ) := φ;
14:
end if 15: end for An example showing the clique size updating after assigning c 6 with color 1 is illustrated in Fig. 7 . The vendor constraint is set as 4, and Fig. 6(b) shows the VVG s (c 6 ) before color assignment. The corresponding VVG s (c 6 ) is shown in Fig. 7(a) and the clique size of c 2 is the first to be updated. There is a 3-clique that contains c 2 in VVG s (c 6 ), so the clique size of c 2 is updated from 3 to 4. The updated value of ω(c 2 ) is larger than ω(c 6 ), so ω(c 6 ) is also updated to 4. The clique sizes of the remaining clusters in VVG s (c 6 ) are updated in the same manner and the final result is shown in Fig. 7(b) .
D. RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
Area is always sensitivity to chip designers, and it is closely related to the number of cores integrated in the MPSoCs. In this subsection, a list scheduling-based resource-constrained task scheduling method is proposed and described in Algorithm 4, where the numbers of available vendors and cores are set as constraints. In contrast to a previously proposed method [21] that conducts task scheduling and vendor assignment in different steps, we execute vendor assignment together with task scheduling to achieve better scheduling results. Let c i be the cluster that v j ∈ c i ; 8: clr(c i ) := clr_dtm(VVG, c i ); 9: Determine core(v j ); 10: Schedule v j to the core in core(v j ) with the smallest v j .finish_time; 11: Schedule v j to the core in core(v j ) with the smallest v j .finish_time; 12: Update the VVG; 13: CQ_Update(VVG, c i , color k ); 14: end while Vendor-constrained task clustering is first executed to enforce the vendor constraints satisfaction (Line 1). Then, each color is mapped to a vendor such that clr(c i ) represents the set of vendors that can be assigned to the cluster c i . core(v j ) is the set of available cores from the vendors in clr(c i ), where v j ∈ c i (Lines 3-5) . Each time we schedule tasks in a cluster c i , we must first determine the candidate vendors that can assign to this cluster (Line 8). Then, the principle of scheduling a task v j involves scheduling and binding it to the core in core(v j ) with the smallest finish time v j .finish_time, and the duplicated task v j is scheduled by the same method as that employed for scheduling v j (Lines 7-11) . Finally, the clique sizes of all sensitive nodes in VVG will be updated each time after scheduling a task (Lines 12-13 ).
Algorithm 4 List
V. SECURITY-AWARE PERFORMANCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
System performance is also one of the key considerations for chip designers, and a performance-constrained task scheduling approach is presented in this section, which minimizes the potential Trojan triggering risks under both the vendor and performance constraints. This approach solves Problem 2, and it consists of four steps (see Fig. 8 ), which are: performance-constrained task clustering, vendorconstrained task clustering, vendor assignment, and task scheduling. As the vendor-constrained task clustering is identical to the resource-constrained task scheduling, we explain the other three steps next. The delays of cores from different IP vendors may be different although they execute the same task, and therefore, it is impossible to determine the execution time for each task before vendor assignment. The virtual performance constraint is introduced in the performance-constrained task clustering, where we assume that each task is executed by the fastest core. Vendor-constrained task clustering is then conducted to ensure the vendor constraint satisfaction. After vendor assignment, the actual execution time of each task is determined, and so is the actual schedule length of this application. The virtual performance constraints are reduced if the actual schedule length violates the performance constraint, and these three steps iteratively repeated until the performance constraints are satisfied. Finally, the tasks are scheduled with a minimization of cores required.
A. PERFORMANCE-CONSTRAINED TASK CLUSTERING
Because the method of clustering tasks in TG can be also be applied to TG , we will discuss the performance-constrained task clustering in TG in this subsection. To minimize the schedule length of TG, several adjacent tasks must enter into the same core to hide the inter-core communication latency, and we first need to determine the timing-critical paths. The slack time of each task slack(v) is calculated as follows.
where t asap (v) and t alap (v) are the as-soon-as-possible and aslate-as-possible schedules of v, respectively, under the given virtual performance constraint; v.exec_time is the execution time of v.
To minimize the number of vendor diversity constraints, we need to contract the least number of edges in TG, and a max-flow min-cut-based method is then proposed. Sink and source nodes (s, t) are added to TG, and two sets of edges, E s and E t , are also added. E s is the set of edges pointing from s to the tasks with no input, and E t is the set of edges pointing from the tasks with no output to t.
The timing violation graph (TVG) is an induced subgraph of TG, which comprises of all tasks with negative slack times. The aim of our performance-constrained task clustering is to obtain a set of contracted edges with the minimum number among all possible sets of edges that make the schedule length satisfy the performance constraint.
Definition 5 (Brother Edge):
Edge e is a brother of e ij if it either starts from v i or ends with v j . in_edge(v) and out_edge(v) are the sets of all edges that end with v and start from v, respectively.
Only one edge in in_edge(v) or out_edge(v) can be contracted when optimizing the performance, and the reason is explained by the following example. Suppose e ij and e ik are brothers; v j and v k can be executed in parallel, but they must be executed sequentially if e ij and e ik are both contracted, which will increases the delays of the related paths.
Let edge e ij point from v i to v j , and dly(e ij ) is the delay decrement between inter-core communication and intracore communication of e ij . The capacity of e ij is denoted as cap(e ij ) and calculated as:
if e ij cannot be contracted; 1 dly(e ij )
, otherwise; Fig. 9 illustrates an example of max-flow min-cut-based performance-constrained task clustering, where the dashed lines are the contracted edges and the gray lines represent the edges whose capacities are ∞. Fig. 9(a) shows the TG, where the execution time of each task is the same, and the dly of all edges are 1 u.t.. Our aim is to minimize the total performance delay by 2 u.t.. In the first iteration of performance optimization, the max-flow min-cut algorithm selects e 1,3 and e 2,4 , as shown in Fig. 9(b) , and they are contracted in the first iteration. The TVG is then updated as shown in Fig. 9(c) , where the max-flow min-cut algorithm selects e 5, 8 , e 6,9 and e 7,9 in the min-cut set, but e 6,9 and e 7, 9 are brother edges, so only one of them can be contracted in this iteration.
If several edges in in_edge(v) or out_edge(v) are selected simultaneously by the max-flow min-cut algorithm (denoted as bro_edge(v)), we must choose the most suitable edge to contract. Let G p (e ij ) be the graph consists of all paths that passing though e ij in TVG, and dly opt (G p (e ij )) estimates the maximum delay that can be optimized in G p (e ij ). The steps of calculating dly opt (G p (e ij )) are summarized as follows.
1) For an edge e with k − 1 brothers, we assume that the probability of selecting e to contract is 1/k, and the delay that may be optimized in e is dly(e)/k; 2) Let dly(e)/k be the length of e and we calculate the lengths of all edges in G p (e ij ). Then, dly opt (G p (e ij )) equals the shortest path length from s to t in G p (e ij ). The edge in bro_edge(v) with the smallest dly opt is contracted because: 1) this edge has the least choices for optimizing the delays; and 2) this edge can no longer be contracted in the following iterations. Fig. 9(d) demonstrates G p (e 6,9 ) and G p (e 7, 9 ), and the length of each edge is denoted in red next to the edge. The values of dly opt (G p (e 6,9 )) and dly opt (G p (e 7,9 )) are 2 and 1.5, respectively, and thus, we contract e 5, 8 and e 7, 9 in the second iteration of min-cut-based task clustering. The TVG is then updated as shown in Fig. 9(e) , and e 3,6 is finally contracted. The final task clustering result is given in Fig. 9(f) with five contracted edges. The details of performance-constrained task clustering method are provided in Algorithm 5. Calculate slack(v), ∀v ∈ TG; 4: Construct TVG; 5: Calculate cap(e), ∀e ∈ TVG; 6: Max_Flow(TVG, cap, cut_set); //cut_set is the set of edges selected by the max-flow min-cut algorithm; 7:
Algorithm 5
is the set consisting of all adjacent edges of v; 8: while exists v that bro_edge(v).num_of _edge > 1 do 9: for each e ∈ bro_edge(v) do 10: Calculate the dly opt (e); 11: end for 12: Find e min ∈ bro_edge(v), with the minimum dly opt ; 13: for e ∈ bro_edge(v)&&e = e min do 14: cut_set.del_edge(e); 15: end for 16: end while 17: for each e ij ∈ cut_set do 18: Cluster(c i , c j ); 19: end for 20: Calculate the schedule length sl; 21: until sl ≤ p c_v
B. PERFORMANCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
The methods proposed in this subsection schedule tasks under both vendor and performance constraints. The core speeds from different vendors may vary, and we must first assign tasks to vendors to determine the actual execution time of each task. Then, a modified force-directed schedulingbased algorithm is conducted to schedule all tasks into certain periods.
Algorithm 6 shows the steps followed to assign each task with the most appropriate vendor. Before vendor assignment, we cannot determine the actual execution time of each task, and we focus only on the inter-core communication delay when optimizing the schedule length. Thus, we ignore the core speed variation when executing the vendor assignment, and set the core speed to be the fastest among all vendors. If the cluster c i contains timing-critical tasks, this cluster color k .cri := 0; color k .sum := 0; 4: end for 5: Construct VVG from TG and TG ; 6: while exist a colorless c i do 7: ρ: computational cost of all tasks in c i ; 8: τ : computational cost of all timing-critical tasks in c i ; 9: clr(c i ) := clr_dtm(VVG, c i ); 10: if τ > 0 then 11: Find color k ∈ clr(c i ), with the maximum color k .cri; 12: c i ← color k ; color k .sum+ = ρ; color k .cri+ = τ ; 13: else 14: Find color k ∈ clr(c i ), with the minimum color k .sum; 15: c i ← color k ; color k .sum+ = ρ; 16: end if 17: Update VVG; 18: Color the duplicated cluster c i in the same manner; 19 : end while 20: Sort the vendors in descending order of core speed; 21: Sort the colors in descending order of color.cri; 22: for int i=1; i ≤ λ; i++ do 23: Tasks with the i-th color are assigned with the i-th vendor; 24 : end for will be assigned to the color available with the maximum computational cost of timing-critical tasks; otherwise, this cluster will be assigned to the color available with the minimum computational cost . Finally, the colors with the maximum color.cri are mapped to the vendors with the fastest core speed to boost the system performance ( .
Then, the details of this performance-constrained task scheduling approach is presented in Algorithm 7. After executing performance-constrained task clustering, vendorconstrained task clustering, and vendor assignment under the vendor constraint λ and virtual performance constraint p c_v , the actual execution time of each task is determined and the actual schedule length (sl) can also be calculated. These three steps are repeated with an iteratively reduced p c_v until the final schedule length satisfies the performance constraint (Lines 3-11) . Then, a force-directed schedulingbased method is implemented to schedule all tasks , and only a small number of cores is required because tasks are scheduled evenly in all time periods.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods, we tested a set of standard task graphs from two sources: VOLUME 6, 2018 Task_Cluster v (G, G , λ);
8:
Vendor(G, G , λ, p c_v ); 9: Calculate the actual schedule length of both G and G , which is denoted as sl; 10: The schedule length overhead is σ := sl − p c ; 11: until σ ≤ 0; 12: Construct the distribution graph for each vendor [35] . 13: while an unscheduled task v i exists do 14: Schedule v i and v i to the period with the smallest force; 15: Update the mobilities of their ancestors and successors; 16: Update the distribution graph of each vendor; 17: end while task graphs that are modeled from actual application programs, including Robot control (robot), Sparse matrix solver (sparse), SPEC fpppp (fpppp); randomly generated task graphs with a large number of tasks, including rand0, rand1, rand2, rand3, and rand4. These task graphs are available from Kasahara Lab., Waseda University. 1 All of the experiments were implemented in C on a Linux Workstation with an E5 2.6-GHz CPU and 16-GB RAM. The details of these task graphs are shown in Table 1 , where column tasks and edges give the numbers of tasks and edges in each task graph, respectively. Column Para. shows the parallelism of each task graph, which is the ratio of the number of tasks to the minimum schedule length; column ACC gives the averaged computational cost of each task, column clique size shows the clique size of each task graph, and the column runtime presents the runtime of our proposed method required to calculate the clique size of each task graph. The results show that our method could calculate the clique size of task graph within a small computational time, 1 Available at http://www.kasahara.elec.waseda.ac.jp/schedule/index.html. and the runtime increases almost linearly with the scale of the input task graph. In the following experiments, the intra-core communication delay is ignored.
B. RESULTS OF RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
This subsection first demonstrates the comparison results between our resource-constrained task scheduling approach (TS R ) and a straight forward method [21] when all security constraints are strictly satisfied. The core speeds of different vendors may be different, and we set the step of speed differences equal to 10% of the fastest core speed in our experiments; i.e., k (ms) and 1.1k (ms) are required for the cores of the first and the second fastest vendors to execute a task with k (u.t.) computational cost, respectively. The Communication-to-Computation Ratio (CCR) is the ratio of the inter-core communication delay to the computational cost of the task, which also plays an important role in determining the schedule length, and the CCR was set to be 1.0 in this experiments. Because all security constraints are satisfied in this set of experiments, vendor-constrained task clustering method is not conducted in our TS R . Table 2 demonstrates the experimental results. The clique sizes of all task graphs are 3 (see Table 1 ), and we assume that 3 IP vendors are required for each task graph. In addition, we set the resource constraints of all vendors to be the same, and column core c gives the resource constraint, which is the number of available cores from each vendor. The SL A and SL B columns show the schedule lengths generated by the straight forward method [21] and our TS R , respectively. SL equals (SL A − SL B )/SL A , which is the ratio of the optimized schedule length to the schedule length of the straight forward method. The results demonstrate that our TS R reduces the average schedule length by 28.2% if compared against the straight forward method. Although the runtimes of our approach are about 10 times larger than the straight forward method, the time complexities of these two approaches are equivalent. In contrast to the straight forward task scheduling method that performs the task coloring and task scheduling in different steps, our TS R conducts task scheduling alongside task coloring, which allow us to select the core from a larger candidate core set core(v) for each task v, thereby reducing the schedule length significantly. A large number of vendors will be required if we strictly follow all security constraints, and the design cost may exceed the budget. Thus, the number of IP vendors available is always given as a constraint. Then, we will demonstrate the task clustering results between our proposed vendorconstrained task clustering method TC v and the cluster-based method [21] if the vendor constraint λ is set to 2. The comparison results are presented in Table 3 , where scy and scy v are the numbers of total security constraints and security constraint violations, respectively. Column Ratio gives the ratio of scy v to scy, and column runtime shows the runtime required for conducting our vendor-constrained task clustering. The results of our proposed method TC v demonstrate that the IP vendor constraint can be satisfied at a cost of 1.34% security constraint violations, while clique-based method causes an average of 1.99% security constraint violations.
C. RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE-CONSTRAINED TASK SCHEDULING
In this subsection, the results of our performance-constrained task clustering and scheduling methods are presented. The schedule length of each task graph is determined by the core speeds, and we ignore the variations of core speeds in task clustering stage because tasks are not assigned to vendors yet. Unit of time (u.t.) is used to describe the schedule length of each task graph.
CCR is one of the key factors that determine the intercore communication delay, and we tested all benchmarks with three different CCR values: 0.1, 0.5, and 1.0. The task clustering results between our performance-constrained task clustering method TC p and cluster-based method [21] are illustrated in Table 4 . SL is the schedule length of each task graph if all security constraints are satisfied. SL min is the minimum schedule length of the task graph obtained by the cluster-based method [21] , and it is set as the performance constraint of our TC p . The results demonstrate that our TC p reduces the security constraint violations if compared against the cluster-based method: our TC p enhances the system security by satisfying another 0.36%, 0.31% and 0.37% security constraints when the CCR are set as 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0, respectively.
Then, our proposed TC p is tested under a variety of performance constraints, and the clustering results are demonstrated in Table 5 , where the performance constraint SL con is set to be SL con = δ * SL, and CCR is set to be 1.0. The clustering results show that our method TC p could optimize the performance significantly, and only a small portion of security constraints are violated. Furthermore, the runtime of our TC p is small even if the scale of the input task graph is large, and it increases almost linearly with the decrease of performance constraint.
Finally, our proposed performance-constrained task scheduling (TS p ) method is tested against the clusterbased scheduling method [21] , and the results are presented in Table 6 . The vendor constraints of the two approaches are set to be 2, and CCR is set to be 1.0. core c is the number of available cores from each vendor, and thus, the number of total cores required by cluster-based method is 2 * core c . The performance constraint p c is set to be the schedule length of the cluster-based scheduling method [21] under the resource constraints. The column ratio gives the ratio of scy v to scy. The percentages of saved scy v and cores by our TS P are given in column Savings.
The results show that our TS P only causes a small portion of security constraint violations (3.21% on average) to satisfy the given vendor and performance constraints, and meanwhile, an average of 18.0% cores are saved if compared against the cluster-based method. In our TS P , a limited number of iterations of task clustering and vendor assignment are executed before the performance constraint is finally satisfied, so the runtime of this approach is acceptable, although the scale of the task graph is large.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The widespread use of COTS electronic components represents a high security risk to the MPSoCs, and thus, the idea of vendor diversity and task duplication has been recently proposed to reduce the risks of triggering hardware Trojans in MPSoC systems. However, these security constraints also bring seriously side effects on the design cost, area and system performance. In this work, we explore the multi-dimension design space between performance, area, security, and two task scheduling approaches are developed for resource-security, performance-security trade-offs. Meanwhile, the number of security constraint violations is minimized In resource-constrained task scheduling approach, the clique size of the vendor violation graph is accurately calculated, and this allows us to optimize the number of IP vendors with a minimum number of security constraint violations. Then, vendor assignment is performed alongside task scheduling, which significantly optimizes the schedule length. In performance-constrained task scheduling approach, the proposed max-flow min-cut-based method enables a trade-off between security-performance, and only a minimum number of security constraint violations is caused to meet the desired performance. Furthermore, this approach schedules tasks to appropriate cores and time periods, and only a small number of cores is required. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of these two approaches. 
